Metropolitan Research Institute, Hungary
There are very different forms of relationships between national governments and their capital cities observable in Europe, as can be seen from the following two examples:
The Paris example shows how cooperation, even if this was not always smooth, can be successful. For example, the 2024 Olympic games will take place in Paris – such a decision presupposes close working between the city and the national government.
The Budapest example is just the opposite. The Hungarian national government is extremely strong (Orbán has been ruling Hungary since 2010, always with a super majority in the Parliament). Since the 2019 local elections Budapest and ten of the 23 secondary cities are now opposed to the national government. Under the leadership of the new green-social-liberal mayor the capital city has built up a new vision for long-term sustainable and inclusive urban development, which is radically different from the ideas and policies of the national government.
Since 2019 the conflicts between the two governments have grown steadily, and it is now clear that the national government aims to cripple the capital with political, financial and regulatory tools. Although the city tries to reach political compromises, in most issues the differences are insurmountable.
The major issue at stake here is multilevel governance. The governance literature is very rich in articulating the important role of local governments vis-a-vis the upper levels of government. The relative power of local governments and their ability to carry out their tasks depends on the level of decentralization, which can be described along the factors of fiscal autonomy (own local government tax revenues and the share of state allocations in total local government revenues) and the tasks and functions assigned to local public administrations. In addition, the functioning of the whole governance system depends also on more direct political tools, such as control over the media, the election system, etc.
In Hungary, as with other post-socialist countries, the collapse of socialism led to decentralization of power - the local governments became the cornerstones of the new democratic political systems (Tosics, 2005). In Hungary this was reflected throughout the 1990s and 2000s in a relatively high, 12-13% share of local government expenditure in GDP (despite privatisation, outsourcing and subcontracting of large parts of municipal service). Since 2010, however, this share has decreased radically to around 6%, half of the EU average, showing that local government autonomy has been increasingly curtailed by the Orbán government (BBR-BBSR, 2020).
Important functions (education, health care) were taken away from local governments, strong state control was introduced over local public services such as water, sewage, refuse collection, etc; and fiscal centralization reduced the revenues of local governments. As a result Hungary became, after two decades of successful decentralised development, a highly centralised country once again.
These regulations apply to all local government authorities, but have particularly hit the biggest and oppositional cities, especially Budapest, as the government gives compensation under different labels to politically loyal cities, clearly punishing the ones where the opposition is in power. Simultaneously, the ‘Law on developments of extraordinary importance’ is applied more often in Budapest, affecting key areas (e.g. City Park). Parliament uses this mechanism to take decisions away from the control of the local government.
In this way the ruling political party imposes its hegemonistic ideas on the city, e.g. rebuilding the Castle area in the ridiculous style of 100 years ago, erecting stadiums and sport halls, and giving extraordinary rights to politically friendly investors. In contrast, the capital city can have, due to the government-induced financial constraints, only smaller development ideas, such as greening of the city and calming car traffic. Even these are attacked by the government-linked media constantly – for example the establishment of new bike lanes is described as an ’attack on car drivers’. Budapest, as one of the 100 EU mission cities, has well elaborated plans on how to reach climate neutrality by 2030, but has little hope that these will receive any support from the national level.
The progressive leaders of Budapest and its city districts are not only hampered by financial and regulatory means but they are also seriously limited in their ability to communicate about those problems, as all major TV and radio stations and the majority of newspapers are under government control, and do not allow access for opposition politicians.
Under such circumstances Budapest has to look for innovative ways of resisting the central state. City leaders aim for the inclusion of residents into decision making (participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies), and consult civic organizations to get support for progressive ideas. Finally, the city decided to launch a legal procedure against the government in an effort to avoid paying the excessive solidarity tax.
In addition, actions are taken also internationally. Budapest was the initiator of the collaboration between the Visegrád-4 Group of capitals, establishing the Pact of Free Cities against their populistic and corrupt national governments. The Pact has now over 30 members from all over the European Union and fights also for more general aims, such as for a larger share of EU funds to be allocated directly to local governments.
Capital cities, as power centres, have always had a special relationship with their national governments (Tosics, 2021). For example, Berlin, Vienna, and Oslo are all oppositional to their national governments. In these countries the central states may frown on the activities of their capital cities, but they do not want to cripple their capitals.
The case of Budapest is clearly different. Nowadays Budapest is a prime example for researchers who want to observe the political, legal, and financial ’war’ between a capital city and its national government. Although this is an exciting research topic, it is much less exciting for the residents of the city, who face day to day new setbacks. Under present circumstances the citizens of Budapest cannot even hope that in the near future this extremely tense relationship could change into a regulated interest conflict, which is normal in multilevel government systems.
I welcome comments on this assessment of the variations in the capital city – national government relationship. To what extent is the case of Budapest unique and what would be your ideas to handle these tense political conflicts?
References:
BBR – BBSR (2020). “Local Governments’ Capacity to Act: A European Comparison”. Authors: S. Kuhlmann, B. P. Dumas, M. Heuberger Tosics, I. (2005). “City Development in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1990: the Impact of Internal Forces” in F. E. Ian Hamilton, K. D. Andrews, and N. Pichler-Milanović (eds.): ’Transformation of cities in Central and Eastern Europe: towards globalization’ Tokyo and New York: The United Nations University Press Tosics, I. (2021). “Urban agendas in the European context”. European Public Mosaic (EPuM): Open Journal on Public Service, 42-61
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The Budapest example is not unique…
A very similar example can be given from my own country. In Turkey, there is no division of duties and powers between the central government and local government that emphasizes the principle of decentralization. Most of the local services are provided by central government organizations. However, in most European countries, as in the case of Paris, local services are increasingly transferred from central governments to local governments. In countries where democracy is adopted as the basic way of life, it is expected that the emphasis on duties and powers related to local needs will be taken from the central government and given to local governments. On the other hand, considering that the financial and administrative management of capitals and metropolises concerns the entire country, it would not be right to leave these decisions only to local governments. The central government should ensure coordination and undertake non-local tasks that will benefit the unity of the country. The proximity of the service produced to the public, its ability to meet demands and be participatory, that is, the democratization of the service, should also be taken into account.
I can complete my article with a suggestion and a question.
The world is experiencing a transition period, known as polycrisis, caused by rapidly increasing change and transformation. The emergence of unexpected events, major disasters (such as earthquakes, epidemics) and climate crises become more evident in big cities. This period requires transition management and strategies created with a new understanding. This transition management that I propose involves exploring common challenges and opportunities for capital cities and metropolises; bringing together a range of different country governments and local authorities to renew their strategies collectively and collaboratively. It may aim to test and work towards implementing innovative solutions for climate change mitigation and adaptation. In collaboration with this network, national and local governments, businesses, and civil society can work together in an integrative way, focusing on the democratic power of spatial planning to address issues related to local cultures and local problems.
My question will be as follow:
Countries where intense disagreements and conflicts occur in local and central government relations have very different historical and political backgrounds. How can it be interpreted that administrative relations are so similar despite this difference? So, will sharing the experience mentioned above become increasingly important?
Iván Tosics’ description of the Hungarian case was – until very recently – an accurate description of the Polish situation as well. After 2015, when the Law and Justice Party came to power in the national parliament, territorial governments in Poland experienced a set of policies designed to limit their functional and financial autonomy, as well as undermine their position in the eyes of citizens. Blame games, imposition of difficult or politically uncertain tasks on local governments, creating financial vulnerability and clientelist relations in place of partnership – these are the most telling examples of the general atmosphere of central government aversion to elected local governments in Poland.
Obviously enough, the capital city of Warsaw, led by a mayor from an opposition party, and a (strong) candidate in the presidential elections of 2020, was in the front line of these attacks on local democracy and the principle of subsidiarity in government decision-making. Various actions undertaken by Warsaw and other large cities (also affiliated with parliamentary opposition) tried to defend the principle of decentralization, but they often seemed too weak to withstand the legal power of the ruling party and its huge dominance of public discourse on television and in other media.
And yet, the results of the national parliamentary elections held on 15 October 2023 seem to promise a new chapter for decentralization and democracy in Poland. With a turnout of over 74%, the Polish nation has broken the voter turnout record of the first free elections held in 1989 and managed to change the composition of the parliament. It is to be hoped that in the not-too-distant future the relations between Warsaw and our national government will move in the direction of the Paris case presented in Iván’s text.
All praise to Ivan Tosics for drawing attention to an important matter, one that has, perhaps, been neglected in modern urban studies: the role of capital cities in shaping societal futures.
His analysis of the oppression of Budapest by the Hungarian national government is both a sad and a salutary story. But Iván invites us to consider afresh the role of capital cities in our rapidly changing world. Perhaps capital cities, even in countries that have drifted to the political right, can escape from being prisoners of their national governments.
Marta Lackowska, in her comments on developments in Poland, speaks to this agenda. She explains how citizens in her country have successfully challenged a national, repressive regime and it seems clear that the leaders of Warsaw, the capital city, have had an important role in this process.
Hülya Turgut is surely right to highlight that we are experiencing a global polycrisis. Capital cities, indeed, all cities, are having to respond to increasingly complex challenges.
Here in the UK, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak leads a right-wing national government that is clearly incapable of responding to these challenges. Sadiq Khan, the left-leaning directly elected mayor of the Greater London Council, has now become a target because he is keen to reduce air pollution in the capital.
As outlined by Ivan in his discussion of developments in Budapest, the UK Conservative Party, in a desperate attempt to avoid being defeated at the next UK General Election due to take place next year, has taken to suggesting that environmentally wise policies – such as 20 mph (32 kph) speed limits in residential neighbourhoods and various traffic calming measures – amount to an ‘attack on car-drivers’. See EURA Conversation #49 for good analysis of the ’15-minute city’.
In a startling turn of events environmental matters that EURA members have been concerned about for more than twenty years have now moved to the centre of political debate in more than a few countries. I encourage EURA members to share their thoughts on how local/central power relationships are unfolding in their country.
This is a very interesting article which raises an important challenge from a new angle. While I would argue that over time other capital cities have been in the stranglehold of their national governments, the Budapest example demonstrates the complete political capture of the city future.
In Dublin, Ireland rather than political capture, we have had political disenfranchisement. The capital city has a persistent problem given the nature of central-local government relations as one of the most centralised polities in the OECD. Rather than left-right politics, the development of Dublin over time has been shaped by an urban-rural binary in the political imagination and discourse and in particular at central government level. This has resulted in what myself and colleagues refer to as a kind of ‘metro-phobia’ (Moore-Cherry and Tomaney, 2019) and a deliberate attempt to constrain the emergence of any form of metropolitan civic capital that would further empower Dublin economically and politically. As a result, Dublin’s administration remains highly fragmented despite some interesting policy novelties in recent years, including the introduction of Metropolitan Area Strategic Plans. However the governance mechanisms have not been put in place for these policies to achieve their potential because it would require a radical reshaping of political and economic power within the wider state system. Some really interesting avenues for comparative debate with this interesting discussion!!